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Abstract: Neo-Fregeanism is a combination of 
two ideas: logicism, according to which arith-
metic can be derived from logic plus definitions, 
and Platonism, according to which there are 
mathematical objects (which are abstract). Neo-
Fregeans propose a new interpretation of Frege’s 
principles of abstraction (mainly the so-called 
Hume’s Principle) and of the role of reconcep-
tualization and implicit definition for the intro-
duction of numbers into our ontology. I analyze 
the ontological implications of neo-Fregeanism, 
not only for mathematics, but for abstract enti-
ties in general. After briefly introducing some of 
the main elements of neo-Fregeanism, I present 
two possible readings of its ontological impli-
cations and I argue that none of them gives the 
desired results. 
Keywords: Platonism, logicism, reconceptualiza-
tion, implicit definitions, priority thesis, nomina-
lism, maximalism, relativism.
Resumen: El neo-fregeanismo es una combinación 
de dos ideas: el logicismo, según el cual se puede 
derivar la aritmética de la lógica y definiciones, y 
el platonismo, según el cual hay objetos matemá-
ticos (abstractos). Los neo-fregeanos proponen una 
interpretación nueva de los principios de abstrac-
ción Fregeanos (especialmente del llamado princi-
pio de Hume) y del papel de la reconceptualización 
y las definiciones implícitas para la introducción 
de los números en nuestra ontología. Analizo las 
implicaciones ontológicas del neo-fregeanismo, 
no sólo para las matemáticas, sino también para 
las entidades abstractas en general. Tras introducir 
brevemente los principales elementos del neo-fre-
geanismo, presento dos interpretaciones alternati-
vas de estas implicaciones ontológicas y argumento 
que ninguna de ella aporta los resultados deseados.
Palabras clave: Platonismo, logicismo, reconcep-
tualización, definiciones implícitas, tesis de la prio-
ridad, nominalismo, maximalismo, relativismo.
1.  Introduction
The literature around neo-Fregeanism (NF, from now on) is very impressive. Neo-
Fregeans promise a solution (or at least the beginnings of one) to some of the most debated 
philosophical issues in the twentieth century: mathematical existence, truth and knowledge. 
The goal of NF is, roughly, to combine two ideas: logicism, according to which arithmetic 
can be derived from logic plus definitions, and Platonism, according to which there are 
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mathematical objects (which are abstract). Most of the literature focuses on the possibility of 
reviving Frege’s logicism, on the interpretation of Frege’s principles of abstraction--mainly 
the so called Hume’s Principle--and on the role of reconceptualization and implicit definition 
for the introduction of numbers into our ontology. Recently, however, some authors have 
attempted to analyze the ontological implications of NF, not only for mathematics, but for 
abstract objects in general. It is within these attempts that this paper belongs.
The ontological implications of both Frege’s logicism and NF are far from clear. There 
are several interpretations of the ontological aspects of NF in the literature. It could be 
claimed that NF leads to “maximalism” (Eklund, 2006, Hawley, 2007); to “quietism” 
(MacBride, 2003) or to “quantifier variance” (Sider, 2007).1 These interpretations have 
important differences among them, but they all have in common a “deflationary” character. 
That is, according to all of them, NF entails some sort of deflationary or minimal ontology. 
By deflationary ontology I mean here, roughly, that there are different interpretations of 
what does and does not exist and none of them is, in principle, better than the others. That 
is, deflationists believe that none of these possible interpretations is more “natural” than the 
others or, in Sider’s terms, none “carves logical reality at its joints”. This idea of NF as a 
kind of ontological deflationism (in which claims about the existence of entities are derived 
from the analysis of language) is best seen in a quote from Wright:
The irresistible metaphor is that pure abstract objects […] are no more than shadows 
cast by the syntax of our discourse. And the aptness of the metaphor is enhanced by 
the reflection that shadows are, after their own fashion, real. (Wright, 1992, p. 181-2).
My plan for this paper is the following. I begin by introducing the main theses of NF, 
paying special attention to its defense of the priority of syntax over ontology and to its notion 
of reconceptualization. I then explore the existential commitments derivable from NF and its 
relation with the notion of analyticity. Afterwards I present two alternative interpretations of 
these commitments, a nominalist and a maximalist one. I claim that both of them are viable 
interpretations of NF and so that, being as it is an attempt to defend a realist position in 
mathematics, maximalism seems to be the best reading (perhaps the only possible reading) 
of NF. Maximalism, though, faces serious problems, which, I claim, NF cannot face unless 
it adopts some kind of relativization. 
2.  Neo-Fregeanism, a brief introduction
NF is to be considered mainly as a particular philosophy of mathematics, a proposal 
regarding mathematical existence, but also mathematical truth and mathematical knowledge. 
But it presupposes some substantive assumptions about the nature of reality and language 
in general. More specifically, it presupposes a particular view about the relation between 
language and reality, a view according to which “the structure of reality mirrors the contours 
of our speech” (MacBride, 2003, p. 108). 
1 Sider does not defend quantifier variance himself; on the contrary, he devotes most of his efforts to combating 
it, but he does claim that it is the best interpretation for a defender of NF.
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As is well known, Frege’s philosophy of mathematics was founded upon two basic 
elements: Platonism and logicism.2 It is also well known that his system failed when Russell 
proved it to be inconsistent. Shortly stated, NF accepts most of the philosophical framework 
underlying Frege’s project, mainly its Platonism, its notion of analyticity of mathematics 
(i.e. its reduction to logic plus definitions) and the thesis that epistemological problems that 
affect platonist theses in mathematics can be solved through this reduction. But they only 
accept part of Frege’s formal apparatus, thus avoiding Russell’s paradox.3
Following the lead of Frege, NF argues that we gain knowledge of mathematical reality 
through the so called “abstraction principles”, in particular the so-called “Hume’s principle” 
(HP, from now on), which functions as an implicit definition of the concept of (cardinal) 
number. In other words, our knowledge of mathematical objects arises from principles that 
are analytic or true by meaning alone, and from our ability to derive mathematical truths 
from those analytic principles. 
One central idea is the Fregean notion of the context principle, according to which 
only in the context of a proposition does a word mean anything. This, plus the idea, 
also Fregean, of the priority of syntax over ontology and the defense of the so called 
“abstraction principles” as an explanation of the way in which we reason, will be the 
core of the argument of NF. According to the neo-Fregeans, a proper understanding of 
the context principle and the priority thesis will not only prove that numbers exist, but 
it will also provide us with an explanation of our knowledge of them, so that it won’t be 
necessary to postulate something like Gödel’s idea of mathematical intuition to explain 
our access to them.
In order to apply all this to mathematical terms, and specifically (from now on) to 
number terms, it is necessary to determine the sense of the statements in which number terms 
occur. Besides, taking -as Platonists do- that number terms stand for self-sufficient objects, 
what is needed is an explanation of the sense of identity statements connecting terms with 
numbers. Very roughly, once we can assume that one such identity statement is true, and 
taken that number terms are singular terms, we will have to accept that they have a reference. 
Therefore, if number terms refer, number objects must exist.
According to NF, knowledge of the basic arithmetical laws (essentially, the Dedekind-
Peano axioms), and hence of the existence of a range of objects which satisfy them -that 
is, knowledge of the concept of (cardinal) number- can be explained (a priori) by fixing 
the truth-conditions of identity statements between (canonical) singular terms and their 
instances; that is, by means of Hume’s Principle, a second order abstraction principle 
according to which, informally:
(HP) The number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and only if there is a one-
one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs
Formally:
(HP) ∀F∀G (nx:Fx = nx:Gx ↔ F 1-1 G) 
2 Frege (1884).
3 See Cook (2009) for an exposition of the differences and similarities between the original Fregean project and 
the NF one.
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Where “F1-1G” is (an abbreviation of) a second order formula expressing that there is 
a one-one correspondence between the object falling under the concept F and the objects 
falling under the concept G.4 
Frege did not consider HP as a definition of the concept of number. Taken as a definition, 
HP faces the so-called “Caesar Problem”, that is, it is incapable of stating whether Julius 
Caesar is a number or not (the definition is not applicable to sentences such as “the number 
of Fs = Julius Caesar”). For this reason, Frege introduced the notion of numbers as the 
extensions of concepts and with it the infamous basic law V which, as is well known, leads 
directly to Russell’s paradox and thus to the collapse of Frege’s logicism. 
Now, it is well known that the Peano Axioms (including the second-order induction 
axiom) can be derived from HP plus suitable definitions of zero, successor and the like. This 
result is known as Frege’s Theorem. It is the contention of NF that this theorem is enough 
for a proper definition of numbers. Further, it is NF’s contention that such a definition is 
enough to ensure the existence of numbers.
Be that as it may, it is not my intention to get into these (otherwise amply discussed) 
technical issues; rather, I will just offer a brief description of the program and focus on the 
ontological implications of HP and NF.5
According to NF, HP is an implicit definition of –cardinal– number and that is what 
is needed to get both the concept of number and to derive the very existence of numbers. 
This raises many questions. To begin with, one might wonder: how can a definition 
determine the existence of the entities it attempts to define? Neo-Fregeans claim that HP 
is an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number and that it is possible to derive 
the existence of cardinal numbers through the (truth of the) identity with equinumerosity. 
But, it might be objected, when we talk about equinumerosity we are not talking about 
numbers: equinumerosity does not require the existence of numbers. How can HP support 
their existence then? How can a definition introduce new objects? 
3.  Implicit Definitions
The answer to these questions requires understanding first the notion of “implicit 
definition” and its role in explaining mathematical knowledge. An implicit definition, 
roughly, is a definition in which the meaning of a term may be given by the assertion of 
statements containing it, by imposing some sort of constraint on the use of longer expressions 
containing the term in question. So if we consider, for example, a sentence #f to be true, we 
can provide “f” with a meaning (a meaning that would make #f true).
According to Wright and Hale, so long as we have asserted that concepts are one-one 
correspondent (so long as we have established Hume’s Principle to be true) “there need to 
be no further problem about our knowledge of certain basic kinds of truths about numbers” 
(2002). Provided that we accept that Hume’s Principle is an implicit definition of the concept 
of number we can know 
4 The second order formula of equinumerosity can be formalized as: $R∀x (Fx →$y (Gy ∧ ∀z (Rxz ↔z=y)) ∧ 
(Gx → $y (Fy ∧ ∀z (Rzy → z=y))). 
5 Wright, 1983, is the locus classicus of NF. See also Hale and Wright, 2001, a compilation of their writings on 
this subject for the last decade or so.
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[S]tatements of [...] numerical identity to be true just by knowing the truth of the 
appropriate statements of [...] one-one correspondence among concepts. We can do 
so for the unremarkable reason that the truth conditions of the former are fixed by 
stipulation to coincide with those of the latter. (Hale and Wright, 2002) 
There are many problems to be solved, however, before this can be a compelling account 
of a priori knowledge of mathematical statements. I focus here on one of them, in my opinion 
a very relevant one since it begs the very problem NF wanted to solve: to prove that there 
are abstract independent objects and that we have access to them.
According to implicit definitions, then, taking #f to be true, and knowing the meaning of ‘#’, 
we can know the meaning of ‘f’: the one which makes ‘#f’ true. But an obvious question arises 
here for, if we can state a priori that #f is true only by knowing the meaning of # and the syntactic 
structure of the sentence, then the meaning of ‘f’ can’t add anything substantial to the semantic 
value of the statement; the meaning of ‘f’ must be, in this sense, conservative. But actually, in 
the case of HP the “number of F” asserts, on a platonist reading, something quite substantial, 
it implies an ontological commitment not present, prima facie, in the one-one correspondence. 
This becomes clearer if we analyze the two sides of the biconditional separately:
The number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs
There is a one-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs
Is easy to see that a) requires the existence of numbers to be considered as a literal 
truth6 while b) does not. Wright answers this stating that even though speakers don’t refer 
to numbers in b), their existence is implicit in the concept of equinumerosity. He claims that 
we can obtain knowledge of abstract objects (numbers or directions, in the other example 
used by him) through our knowledge of concrete ones (relation of equinumerosity or relation 
of parallelism between two lines). 
Moreover, and this leads us to the point to be discussed here, he claims that we can infer 
the existence of the former from the existence of the latter, but how can this be possible? 
According to him, the existence of abstract objects such as numbers is conceptually 
necessary and follows logically from the existence of equinumerosity (as the existence of 
directions follows logically from the existence of parallel lines). And this is so, he claims, 
because HP is to be considered a “reconceptualization”.
4.  Reconceptualization
Basically, considering HP as a reconceptualization means claiming that the two sides of 
the biconditional have the same content, the difference being only in the way this content 
is conceptualized. Hence it is relatively easy to see how HP guarantees the existence of 
numbers. The idea is to go from the truth of the right-hand-side of the biconditional (there 
is a one-one correspondence between the Fs and the Gs) to the truth of the left-hand-side 
(the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs).
6 Literal in contrast with fictional or metaphorical truths. NF requires singular terms to refer to “real” entities, and 
not fictional or imaginary ones. Further on, I specify how they claim that if a statement is determined to be true, 
following the established criteria, then it is “really” true. That is, literally true.
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Now, if both sides of the biconditional have the same content, numbers would have to 
be somehow present in talk of equinumerosity. But surely, one might object, this cannot be 
so, since the left-hand side quantifies over numbers and the right hand side doesn’t. Against 
this, neo-Fregeans argue that, contrary to appearances, when we talk about equinumerosity 
we are implicitly assuming the existence of numbers (even though we are not quantifying 
over them and thus we are not making any reference to them). 
This is a crucial, and problematic, aspect of NF. We have to be able to use concepts 
without knowing which entities fall under it, or at least, without knowing all the entities that 
fall under it. Wright establishes a useful distinction here; he claims that even though talk 
about equinumerosity implicitly entails a commitment to the existence of numbers, it does 
not entail reference to numbers. Using his example, talk about “aunt” implicitly entails a 
commitment to the existence of parent and a sister (irrespective of whether we know it or 
not), but it does not necessarily entail referring to any of those.
One aspect worth mentioning, for it will be relevant for our later discussion, is that by 
HP and other abstraction principles, and by the idea of reconceptualization, Neo-Fregeanists 
do not attempt to claim that numbers are introduced or created in some way. What is 
introduced is the concept of number, but the objects (numbers) were part of the underlying 
ontology presupposed by talk of equinumerosity. I think it might be helpful to quote Wright’s 
exposition of the idea of reconceptualization (through the use of another example involving 
the concept of direction):
Consider again the abstraction for directions:
Da=Db if and only if a//b
The dilemma was that we either regard the left hand side simply as a definitional 
transcription of the right, and thereby forfeit the possibility of taking its syntax at face 
value, of treating it as a genuine identity statement linking genuine singular terms in 
existentially generalizable position; or we take the principle as a substantial claim, 
to the effect that certain abstract objects –directions- are associated with lines in the 
way it describes, in which case we have no right simply to lay the principle down as 
a definition. But the key to Frege’s view is that the dilemma is a false one – it is the 
thought, roughly, that we have the option of laying down the Direction abstraction, 
of reconceptualizing, as it were, the type of state of affairs which is described on 
the right. […] The concept of direction is thus so introduced that that two lines are 
parallel constitutes the identity of their directions. […]
It is important to be clear that it would be a misrepresentation of this idea to view it 
as involving the notion that abstract objects are creations of the human mind, brought 
into being by a kind of stipulation. What is formed –created- by such an abstraction is 
rather a concept: the effect is merely to fix the truth-conditions of identity statements 
concerning a new kind of thing, and it is quite another question whether those truth-
conditions are ever realized. (Wright, 1997, pp. 277-278).
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So, NF claims that the existence of numbers (or directions) is already present (albeit 
implicitly) when we talk about equinumerosity relations (or parallelism). Hence neo-
Fregeans do not want to defend the conditional assertion according to which “if numbers 
exist, then HP”. Such conditional is not necessary, they claim, for numbers are part of the 
underlying ontology.
Now, even though the idea of reconceptualization is central for the NF program, it 
ultimately rests on a general conception of the relation between language and reality and 
therefore on the thesis of the priority of syntax over ontology and the context principle. These 
two principles (or theses) will also allow us to explore the possibilities of generalizing the 
NF proposal beyond the mathematical realm and to explore thus its ontological implications.
5.  The priority thesis
According to Wright, the priority thesis not only asserts that there is a particular relation 
between reference and truth, i.e., that if certain statements (paradigmatically identity 
statements) are true then singular terms that occur in them (in the right way) do refer to 
determinate objects (through the context principle), and thus these objects exist. It also states 
that truth is prior to reference. That is, if, by ordinary criteria, a statement is true, then it is 
really true (beyond any reasonable doubt). Hence, if by ordinary criteria7 we establish the 
truth of a mathematical statement, we can establish that the singular terms occurring in it 
refer and, thus, the existence of mathematical entities (to which these terms refer) would 
be proved beyond any doubt. Wright, in one of his most quoted paragraphs, explains it so:
According to [the thesis of the priority of syntactic over ontological categories], 
the question whether a particular expression is a candidate to refer to an object is 
entirely a matter of the sort of syntactic role which it plays in whole sentences. If it 
plays that sort of role, then the truth of appropriate sentences in which it so features 
will be sufficient to confer on it an objectual reference; and questions concerning the 
character of its reference should then be addressed by philosophical reflection on the 
truth-conditions of sentences of the appropriate kind. If, therefore, certain expressions 
in a branch of our language function syntactically as singular terms, and descriptive 
and identity contexts containing them are true by ordinary criteria, there is no room 
for any ulterior failure of ‘fit’ between these contexts and the structure of the states of 
affairs which make them true. So there can be no philosophical science of ontology, 
no well-founded attempt to see past our categories of expression and glimpse the way 
in which the world is truly furnished. (Wright, 1983, pp. 51-52)
7 What is meant by ordinary criteria is, precisely, one of the most problematic issues of the proposal. We’ll try 
to see the alternatives later, when we talk about the possible limitations to NF’s overinflated ontology. Field, 
1989, expresses the difference between a trivial reading of the context principle and the more radical one by 
differentiating between a “weak” and a “strong” priority thesis. He then argues that it is not possible to develop 
a proper account of what is meant by “ordinary criteria” and thus, that the strong priority thesis (needed to 
ensure Platonism) is not viable.
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So, NF reverses the usual, realist, way of understanding the relation between language 
and reality, in which it is generally assumed that the nature of reality is fixed independently 
of language. Neo-Fregeans believe that language and reality are very closely related; so 
closely in fact that, as MacBride puts it, “the structure of reality inevitably mirrors the 
contours of our language” (2003, p. 108). 
6.  Existential commitments and analyticity
So far so good, but it is far from clear how the notion of implicit definition, the priority 
thesis and the subsequent notion of reconceptualization could bear the weight of the 
existential commitments required by platonists. I present two possible interpretations of 
NF. One leads to triviality, making the claim that numbers exist superfluous. The second 
leads to an overgeneralization, entailing the existence of counterintuitive, exceptional and 
even incompatible entities. Ultimately, I claim, the only way available for NF is to accept 
the introduction of a certain level of relativization. 
This should not be a surprise - it follows directly from some basic aspects of the neo-
Fregeans’ philosophical framework, i.e., from their belief in the preeminence of language 
over ontology. But it would certainly be a problem for them. It would mean, that their 
main goal, defending and justifying Platonism, accounting for mathematical knowledge 
and mathematical truth, has failed. 
An apparent problem with NF, we hinted, was understanding how it was possible 
to logically derive the existence of certain kind of entities from the existence of some 
other –completely different- entities. That is, how to make sense of the claim that 
numbers are independent objects, completely different from equinumerosity and yet 
their existence and properties follow logically from the existence and properties of 
equinumerous objects.
Actually, nothing would prevent constructing the identity in nominalistic terms. Or, 
more precisely, a nominalist reading of the meaning of “the number of F” will not change 
the truth-value of the whole. It will not make it false, but only “fictionally” true. The 
“number of F” could be read as a singular term syntactically speaking, but functioning 
semantically like fictional terms such as “Hamlet”, and this will not change the semantic 
value of the identity. So, what prevents us for making this nominalist reading of the 
identity, apart from some independent considerations about the convenience of not doing 
so? That is, the choice between a platonist or a nominalist reading does not seem to be 
determined by anything contained in NF, failing thus in one of its main goals: justifying 
and accounting for Platonism. 
 This ontological neutrality follows from the required analyticity of HP and of the 
abstraction principles in general. The problem is explaining how an analytic principle, such 
as HP, can guarantee the existential commitment required by the platonists. This is a doubt 
similar to the one raised by Boolos in his article “Is Hume’s principle analytic?” HP possesses 
too much content to be analytic. Boolos suggests that there is a clear analogy between HP and 
“the present king of France is royal” in that “we have no analytic guarantee that for every value 
of “F”, there is an object that the open definite singular description “the number belonging 
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to F” denotes” (1998, p. 306).8 In other words, there seems to be “no reason at all to believe 
that it is analytic that for every F, there is such a (unique) object x”. (Boolos, 1998, p. 308).9
 Platonists could argue that implicit definitions do indeed require existential commitment 
since, as we have seen, the context principle requires that number terms within it have a 
referent. But this is not straightforward. Following Hartry Field (1989) we could differentiate 
between weak and strong priority theses (priority of syntax). According to the weak priority 
thesis number terms function syntactically as singular terms and therefore also function 
semantically as such. This ensures that number terms can’t be reduced to terms about one-
one correspondence (it keeps the semantical independence of the former and so avoids what 
Field calls “ontological reductionism”).
This weak thesis is strong enough to grant the viability of existential commitment of 
statements of the form:
2 + 1 = 3
The number of books in this room is greater than or equal to 3
But it doesn’t rule out completely the possibility of denying it. It is not enough, in order to 
defend Platonism, to develop a way of stating that by Hume’s Principle together with the context 
principle, we can infer that number terms refer and that number objects exist. What is needed 
is a way of asserting that it is necessarily true that numbers exist, that every question about the 
existence of numbers is “vacuous”. And the weak priority thesis certainly does not grant this.
Consider a staunch nominalist. She could accept, in the light of the arguments given so far, that 
(2) is true and thus that the term “3”, being a singular term, implies an existential commitment. 
But that would not prevent her from arguing (as Field in fact does, or at least did) that (2) can 
and should be re-formulated so that “3” doesn’t function as a singular term any more, but rather 
appears as part of a numerical quantifier. That is, (2) could, and perhaps should, be read as, 
2*. There are at least 3 books in the room,
which does not entail the existence of numbers or any other abstract entity.
Of course, the nominalist who re-formulates sentences this way will have to give reasons 
as to why we should prefer (2*) over (2) and show that we can make similar re-formulation 
for the relevant cases. But this is not the important point here. The relevant point is to 
notice that implicit definition plus context principle does not guarantee the existence of 
numbers. Or rather, that implicit definitions plus the context principle are compatible with 
a nominalist reading. If what we want is to justify our knowledge of mathematical entities 
and account for mathematical truth, we need to show that the existence of those objects is 
necessary; we need to prove, by implicit definition, that those objects exist. Otherwise it 
won’t be possible to state, as NF does, that just by knowing the truth of statements about 
8 Boolos also develops in this article what has been called “the bad company argument” according to which 
“there may be some analytic truths in the vicinity of HP with which it is being confused”. More on this later.
9 Ibid, pp. 308. Recall that in this quote another problem is being mentioned: the problem of uniqueness. How can 
we know that the concept F denotes one, and only one, object x?. 
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one-one correspondence we know the truth of statements about numbers (and hence that we 
have knowledge of numbers themselves through knowledge of equinumerosity).
So the weak priority thesis is not enough to assert, as Wright (1983) does, that it is “a 
preconception inbuilt into the syntax of our arithmetical language” that “4” is not only a 
singular term, but one which in fact denotes. 
According to Wright, statements about equinumerosity entail existence commitments10 
about numbers and so every doubt about the existence of numbers must be vacuous. 
[I]t has to be the case that when it has been established, by the sort of syntactic 
criteria sketched, that a given class of terms are functioning as singular terms, and 
when it has been verified that certain appropriate sentences containing them are, 
by ordinary criteria, true, then it follows that those statements do genuinely refer. 
(Wright, 1983, p. 14).
But we have argued that the weak reading of the priority thesis doesn’t entail that all 
doubts about the existence of numbers are vacuous. Platonists need something “stronger”. 
The problem, of course, is establishing what more is needed and, above all, how to combine 
it with the analytic nature of HP and arithmetic. The question would rest, ultimately, on 
the definition of analyticity. A proper definition of analyticity would allegedly not only 
clarify what level of content can be introduced in order to derive the required existential 
commitments, it would also contribute to solving one of the most pressing problems 
affecting NF: the so-called “Bad company objection”. We shall see this objection briefly in 
the next section and the relevance of the notion of analyticity to it, but I will not get into 
further details about this issue. Until an account of what a stronger priority thesis might 
possibly be, and how it might work respecting the boundaries imposed by analyticity, the 
nominalist interpretation remains a plausible one. The existence of numbers does not follow 
from HP (plus definitions). It is an independent presupposition. A presupposition that we 
might accept or not, in the light of other considerations, but that is not forced upon us by NF. 
In other words, HP could be indeed considered as an analytic principle and so could play 
its role as a principle upon which derive the basic axioms of arithmetic, only if we read it as:
(HP*) If numbers exist → ∀F∀G (nx:Fx = nx:Gx ↔ F 1-1 G) 
But this, as we already said, although it might have some interest for a definition of 
number properties, is ontologically trivial; it does not rule out the possibility of there being 
no numbers, and HP still being true. 
10 Notice that Wright doesn’t claim that statements about equinumerosity entail reference to numbers, but only 
existential commitments. This is an important difference. We could imagine some language, some model for 
arithmetic, in which we could state the basic rules of arithmetic without any use of numbers (we could imagine 
a society in which nobody has ever heard of numbers). It would be wrong to claim that people who used this 
language without number terms (because they don’t know them) were referring nonetheless to numbers. But 
we could claim that by their use of this model of arithmetic they were making an existential commitment 
to numbers (using one-one correspondence terms, for example, they are implicitly stating the existence of 
numbers but they are not referring to numbers). 
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7.  Linguistic approaches to ontology. Maximalism 
NF is not alone in deriving ontological conclusions from linguistic premises. This is 
a quite common view in analytic philosophy. Quine notoriously claimed something along 
these lines.11 According to him, and to what has been called the Quinean school, what there 
is, is what our best theory of the world is ontologically committed to, or, in other words, what 
this theory quantifies over. In Quine’s famous words “to be is to be the value of a variable”.
Here too, we do not come to know what there is, and through this knowledge assert what 
should be our ontological commitments. Rather, we first establish what is our best theory 
of the world and then we look for the ontological commitments of this theory, by seeing 
what its statements quantify over. By knowing these ontological commitments, we come to 
know what there is.
Linguistic approaches, like NF and Quine’s, share an important and controversial 
consequence: they all seem to lead to an overinflated ontology. This generous view about 
ontology has received different names, “maximalism”, “absolutism” or “explosivism” 
among others. I use the term “maximalism,” for it is the one commonly used in connection 
with NF. Very roughly, what maximalism claims is that everything that can exist does 
exist. In the area of philosophy of mathematics this view has important similarities with 
the “full-blooded Platonism” defended by Mark Balaguer (1998), according to which every 
mathematical object that can exist, in the sense of logical possibility, exists. 
To see how NF leads to maximalism, I’ll use the example developed by Matti Eklund 
(2006). 12 According to this example, NF is committed to the existence of certain extraordinary 
objects called “incars”: “would-be objects almost like cars except for the difference that they 
only exist when or in so far as they are inside garages” (Eklund, 2006, p.102). So, every time 
a car goes into a garage, a new entity comes into existence (incar) and it stops existing every 
time the car goes out of the garage. Notice that we are not talking of a new concept or of a 
new property of cars coming into existence: incars are supposed to be entities by themselves. 
It is easy to see why NF would be committed to the existence of incars. According to 
them the only requirement for an entity to exist is being the referent of a singular term that 
appears in a true identity statement. Thus incars exist if there are true sentences containing 
“incar” in the right place. 
Maximalism is certainly a difficult position to hold. Consider yet another potential 
problem, enunciated by Putnam (who uses the name explosivism instead of maximalism). 
Explosivism (as enunciated by Sosa) focuses on supervenient objects rather than on 
extraordinary ones; in the possibility of an indefinite number of entities coming out of each 
object and each event and existing “by themselves”, that is, independently:
In recursion theory and hierarchy theory (…) we regularly take numbers as indi-
viduals, and functions of numbers, functions of functions, functions of functions 
of functions…. (…) as primitive. We do not take sets to be additional theories [as 
11 See Quine (1948), Lowe (1995) and Eklund (2006).
12 Sosa (1999) develops a similar example to illustrate the position he calls explosivism or absolutism, using 
“snowdiscalls”. Heck (2000) develops a similar argument against NF using the example of “Duds”.
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the explosionist theory seems to require], but “identify” them with characteristic 
functions. In another branch of mathematics (set theory), we regularly take sets as 
primitive, and identify functions with sets of ordered pairs. I have never met a phi-
losopher or a mathematician who thinks there is a “fact of the matter” as to which 
is right! Yet they can’t be both right. (…) But if we go for the “exploding reality” 
approach, what do we do? Do we say there is a (possibly unknowable) “fact of the 
matter” as to whether sets are characteristic functions or functions are sets of ordered 
pairs? That, I must admit, seems crazy to me! (Putnam, 2004, p.244)
Maximalism is not the only option available in the literature for NF, though I do believe 
it is the most “natural” one. Ted Sider has recently defended an interpretation of NF in terms 
of quantifier variance. There is a very nice discussion between Sider and Katherine Hawley 
(2007) about which of these two views, maximalism or quantifier variance, is the most 
adequate interpretation of NF. I will not get into this debate here, for I argue that even though 
maximalism is the most straightforward interpretation, in the end it will face the dilemma 
of having to introduce some relativistic elements in the theory. Whether this relativism is 
better read as a kind of quantifier variance or whether it leads to some sort of quietism (as 
MacBride, 2003, claims) will remain as an open question. The main goal of the remainder 
of this paper is to show, first, that maximalism is indeed a coherent way to interpret NF and, 
second, that in order to serve the goals of NF, it will have to be restricted. 
8.  NF as Maximalism
In order for HP to be a proper explanation of the concept of number, NF needs to show 
that it is possible to understand a concept without knowing what objects fall under it. That 
is, that it is possible to grasp the meaning of the left-hand-side of the biconditional (“The 
number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs”), merely by grasping the meaning of the 
right hand side of the biconditional (“there is a 1-1 relation between the Fs and the Gs”). 
We should be able to understand a concept like the one expressed on the left hand side of 
HP, to understand that the objects falling under it stand in a 1-1 relation, without knowing 
whether certain objects (numbers) fall under it.
As Hawley points out, maximalism fulfills this requirement. According to maximalism, 
all sorts of objects exist, objects we don’t know about, objects that can be, in some cases, 
quite counterintuitive (like incars):
Presumably many of these things fall under concepts which we all understand (like 
being self-identical), so it must be possible to understand a concept without having 
a firm grasp on all the things which fall under it. Maximalism makes it compulsory 
to think of our understanding of concepts roughly as the neo-Fregeanists do, on pain 
of our not understanding even very familiar concepts. So, if we grant maximalism to 
the neo-Fregeanists the problem of impredicativity dissolves. (Hawley, 2007, p. 241) 
Remember that the advocates of NF don’t want to assert that through HP and 
reconceptualization we create numbers (or any other objects). Numbers already exist, 
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and their existence is implicit in the concept of equinumerosity. Thus, it seems that NF 
would need to assume a very rich ontology, richer maybe that they’d like to admit. 13 
Maximalism makes it easier, up to a certain extent, to defend Platonism through HP and 
reconceptualization. But it also faces the so-called “Bad Company objection”. 
Actually, the Bad Company objection is one of the main obstacles, if not the main one, 
for NF. So it is not really an objection against maximalism per se. If we accept that HP is 
(conceptually) true, then it is so in virtue of its form, in virtue of its being an abstraction 
principle. But then all abstraction principles, that is, all principles of the form:
∀P∀Q (φP =φQ ≡ Q ♠ P)
where ♠ is the equivalent relations on entities of the type P, Q, and φ is a function from 
entities of that type to objects, are (conceptual) truths. But this is clearly false, for consider 
Frege’s (in)famous basic law V:
The value-range of F = the value-range of G iff F and G are coextensive
which Russell’s paradox proved to be inconsistent. In fact, Boolos (1990) proved that, even 
if we add a consistency restriction over abstraction principles, the problem remains. And he 
did so by introducing the so-called parity abstraction principle,
The parity of F = the parity of G iff F and G differ evenly (where two concepts differ 
evenly if an even number of things fall under one but not the other) (Eklund, 2006, 
p. 111).
which is consistent but can only be true in finite domains. The problem is thus that both 
principles, HP and parity, are consistent and satisfiable; but HP is only satisfiable in infinite 
domains and the parity principle in finite ones. Hence, they are not both co-satisfiable. NF 
still owes an explanation of what abstraction principles are acceptable, and what are not.
Anyhow, there is a huge amount of literature on the Bad Company objection, and the 
problem is still far from being solved (Hale and Wright, 2001, acknowledge it as one 
of the most pressing problems for NF). Our concern here is whether, and how, it affects 
maximalism, and whether maximalism can help in solving it.
Eklund claims, and I agree, that the Bad Company objection, under the light of 
maximalism, is clearly just a particular instance of a more general problem; the problem 
of incompatible objects. And so, abandoning abstraction principles will not help solving it. 
According to this problem,
Certain numbers exist, on a maximalist view. But then consider anti-numbers, where 
the concept of an anti-number is the concept of an abstract object whose existence 
13 Really, they don’t “presuppose” any ontology; the ontological commitments are imposed by syntactic 
considerations (through the priority thesis). I say a richer ontology than they’d admit because it is far from clear 
that actual NF (mainly articulated by Hale and Wright) would accept this maximalist interpretation of their view. 
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both supervenes on anything one likes and rules out the existence of numbers. Anti-
numbers too would seem to satisfy maximalism’s conditions for existence. But tri-
vially numbers and anti-numbers cannot coexist. (Eklund, 2006, p. 112)
9.  Is there any alternative to maximalism for realists?
The problem of incompatible objects is indeed a very serious one, and it doesn’t seem 
to have an “easy” solution from the maximalist perspective. Actually it might be that the 
only way to solve it is through the acceptance of some kind of “conceptual relativity”. 
Relativization is not foreign to NF, and at some points, some traces of it can be found in 
the writings of both Hale and Wright. 
Both in the case of incompatible objects and in the case of extraordinary ones, it seems 
that what we need is some sort of constraint on the criteria we use to assert that certain 
identity statements are true. Recall that the priority thesis states that when, by ordinary 
criteria, a statement is true, it is really true (beyond any reasonable doubt). This idea of 
“ordinary criteria” is, I believe, the key notion here. 
It could be claimed that, in the case of extraordinary objects, their counterintuitiveness is 
a reason to deny their existence. After all, it would be reasonable enough to consider as part 
of our “ordinary criteria” to reject statements that imply their existence. That is, it could be 
stated that it is part of our ordinary criteria to consider statements that refer to incars false. But 
this option faces two objections. On the one hand, the requirement of “intuitiveness” is way 
too vague to constitute the basis for deciding which (identity) statements are to be considered 
true and which false. Besides, the whole idea seems to go against NF’s priority thesis, for we 
would be determining the truth of the statement on the basis of its ontological implications.
It seems clear that the constraint would have to be placed not on the ontological 
implications of the theory, but rather on language. That is, what is needed is a way to 
determine what identity statements are really true and which are not, without begging the 
question, without establishing beforehand what are the correct consequences to be derived 
from the distinction. One way of doing this is by focusing on language usages; that is, on 
the way we use the identity statements, and perhaps more importantly, the singular terms 
contained in them. This option would not be entirely within the spirit of NF, of course, 
since what they claim is that syntax comes prior to ontology, that taking into account only 
the syntactic structure of the statements we should be able to conclude whether it is true or 
false and hence whether the terms in it refer or not. But then again, maximalism itself is not 
the aimed ontology of neo-Fregeans. So it is worth considering whether introducing these 
pragmatic considerations might help, if not NF, at least maximalism. 
Consider the case of a linguistic community in which talk of incars is perfectly consistent 
but in which talk of cars is highly objectionable; maybe, instead of a generic term for all 
cars in any situation as we have, they have different names depending on the location of 
the car, so that they have incars and outcars. Thus, following NF, names such as incars and 
outcars as used in this community would refer, even though in our community usage they 
do not. In other words, different uses of language determine different ontologies. 
Actually, these kinds of cases are quite common in ordinary language. Consider for instance 
the difference in Spanish between “pez” and “pescado”. Spanish speakers use different terms to 
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denote fish, depending on whether it has been fished or not. That is, they use the word “pez” to 
denote all living or dead fishes which have not been fished (by humans) and “pescado” to all living 
or dead fish which have already been fished. Consequently, one would always eat “pescado”, 
and never “pez” but, if snorkeling, one would always see “peces” and never “pescados”. 
It won’t certainly be intuitive to derive from this that there are two different and independent 
entities, “peces” and “pescados”; that when a fish gets fished it ceases to exist and a new entity 
comes into existence and occupies its place (the “fished-fish” or “pescado”). But following 
maximalism, this is what we should claim, for we do not have a criteria to determine which 
of these uses leads to valid identity statements, i.e. true and thus with referring singular terms, 
and which to invalid identity statements, i.e. false and thus with non-referring singular terms.
Maximalism would of course make no distinction among these different uses, all of 
them are linked to one single and very rich underlying ontology. Differences in language 
use would be then just differences in ways of shaping or understating that underlying and 
amorphous bunch of existing entities. Flat or full-fledged relativism would on the contrary 
claim that each of these uses determines a concrete ontology since language and language 
uses determine what there is. 
NF stands, as I see it, between these two positions. Because their aim is to defend 
Platonism, the most natural reading would be along the lines of maximalism. But maximalism 
faces the problem of incompatible entities, and, in the case of NF, it leads to the bad company 
objection. Thus, they need to put some restrictions on the ontology or, in their case, on the 
criteria to determine if an identity statement is really true and thus if the terms contained 
in it do indeed refer. 
Again, neo-Fregeans do not claim that by stipulating the truth condition of the (identity) 
statements we create any objects. So they would reject the idea that the existence of incars/
outcars or peces/pescados depends on a determinate conceptual scheme or community 
usage. Rather, they would claim, what is introduced, or not introduced, are the concepts of 
incars/outcars and peces/pescados. This prevents their view from falling into flat relativism 
or quietism (as MacBride, 2003, defines it) but it also makes it even more difficult to 
conceive a possible restriction to maximalism to avoid not only extraordinary objects but, 
more importantly, incompatible ones. 
Even though it is concepts that are introduced, NF entails that, when using them, we are 
implicitly “assuming” the existence of the entities in question. That is, when using the term 
“pescado”, in a true identity statement, one would be implicitly entailing the existence of 
“pescado-entities”, which are different from “pez-entities”, since their concepts differ and the 
truth conditions of identity statements in which they appear might thus vary. So, once again, 
NF either accepts that both type of entities exist (maximalism) or draws a line in accordance 
with the different uses; finding a way to establish what uses are “correct” and “incorrect”, 
without begging the very question they wanted to answer: which entities exist and which don’t.
In any case, and to conclude, regardless of whether we introduce some sort of constraint 
to determine which identity statements are correct and which are not or whether we resign 
ourselves and go for a full-blooded maximalism, the most NF can show is that Platonism 
is a viable interpretation of HP and the abstraction principles in general. Or more precisely, 
they won’t be able to claim that it is the best interpretation and certainly not, as they aim 
to, that it is the only viable one. 
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NF can only satisfy those who are already convinced that abstract entities exist and 
that numbers are indeed abstract entities. If taken as an attempt to prove Platonism, I have 
claimed that NF fails, because its ontological implications are not the desired ones. A defense 
of Platonism can only come from considerations external to NF. 
References
Balaguer, M. (1998) Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.
Boolos, G. (1990) “The Standard Equality of Numbers”, reprinted in Boolos (1998) Logic, 
Logic and Logic. Harvard University Press, pp.202-220.
Cook, R.T. (2009) “New waves on an Old Beach: Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics 
Today”, in O. Bueno & O. Linnebo (eds) (2009) New waves in philosophy of mathematics. 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp.13-34.
Eklund, M. (2006) “Neo-Fregean Ontology”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20, Metaphysics: 
95-121.
Field, H. (1989) Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Oxford: Blackwell.
Frege, G. (1884) Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. W. Koebner, Breslau. English translation 
by J.L Austin (1950) The Foundations of Arithmetics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hale, B. and Wright, C. (2001) The Reason’s Proper Study Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, B. and Wright, C. (2002) “Benacerraf’s Dilemma Revisited”, European Journal of 
Philosophy, 10: 101-29.
Hawley, K. (2007) “Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 233-249.
Heck, R. (2000) “Syntactic Reductionism”, Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3): 124-149.
Lowe, E.J. (1995) “The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects”, The Journal of Philosophy 92 
(10): 509-520.
MacBride, F. (2003) “Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo-Logicism”, British Journal 
of Philosophy of Science 54: 103-163.
Putnam, H. (2004) “Sosa on Internal Realism and Conceptual Relativity”, in Greco, J (ed) 
Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 233-248.
Quine, W.V. (1948) “On What There Is”, Review of Metaphysics 2: 21-38.
Sider, T. (2007) “Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 201-232.
Sosa, E. (1999) “Existential Relativity” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1): 132-143.
Wright, C. (1983) Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen University Press.
Wright, C. (1997) “On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s Theorem”. Reprinted in 
Hale and Wright 2001, pp. 272-307.
